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THE SOCIAL ROOTS
OF GUATEMALAN
RESISTANCE

LET'S FAKE A DEAL
A History of Arms
Control
MARCY DARNOVSKY

SHELTON H. DA VIS
"No one has ever been able to organize the Indians,
but if anyone should, God save us."
-Guatemalan Businessman (1980)
"The presence of the Indian people in the revolutionary popular war-in all its forms of struggle-is a political and military fact that the present government can no
longer deny or contain. It is critical to understand this
particularity of the Guatemalan revolutionary transformation which the country is undergoing."
- Guerrilla Army of the Poor (1981)
Located in hundreds of small communities scattered
throughout the majestic Western Highlands and speaking 22 different languages, Guatemalan Indians are
increasingly assuming positions of leadership in the
guerrilla movement, and experiencing the brunt of the
Lucas government's program of violence, terror, and
repression.
Although periodic Indian revolts occurred throughout the Colonial and independence periods, the roots of
the current Indian resistance must be traced to the land
and labor legislation that accompanied the Guatemalan
Reform period in 1871. Beginning in that year and continuing until the fall of the regime of Jorge Ubico in
1944, the entire apparatus of the Guatemalan state-its
legislative machinery, its police powers, and its departmental and municipal organization-was geared to
mobilizing Indian labor for the demands of the growing
coffee economy of the Guatemalan Pacific coast.
Between 1871 and I 944, a vast body of agrarian legislation was passed to satisfy the labor needs of the new
class of coffee planters. At the same time, the Guatemalan government instituted a number of laws to expropriate Indian communal lands. In 1884 alone, over
100,000 acres of Indian municipal lands passed into private hands. During this period, ladinos or non-Indians
conlinued on page 2

At long last the public's passions have been aroused
and aimed at the horrors of nuclear war. But an aroused
populace is not necessarily a discerning one, and
groundswells driven by fear and moral fervor can quickly ebb away or be sidetracked by image manipulation
from on high .
The growing ranks of disarmers have already forced
Reagan to temper his overconfident bellicosity and to
advance "bold new" arms control proposals. While he
is still drawing deeply from the bag of tricks filled with
missile gaps, windows of vulnerability, and theRussians-are-coming, the president has opened a second
sack of shared goals and promises of negotiations for
arms reductions.
The majority of disarmers will see through the crude
sleight-of-hand that Reagan is proposing: to proceed
with a vast military buildup while talk about reductions
soothes the public. Administration officials have said as
much. On May 8, they described Reagan's proposals as
"an effort to turn public attention away from the antinuclear movements in the United States and Western
Europe."
Other politicians have come up with "arms control"
schemes only fractionally less obscene than Reagan's.
Ted Kennedy, for example, supports a nuclear freezein exchange for increases in conventional arms and
armies. There will be many more proposals.
The coming arms control extravaganza represents
nothing new. Between World War II and 1980, officials
of the US and the Soviet Union met more than six thousand times to discuss arms control. Yet the superpowers
have not been able to agree on eliminating a single existing weapon. The nuclear buildup has survived a test ban
treaty, an ABM treaty, a SALT I and a SALT II. It has
weathered storms of public protest almost as easily as it
conlinued on page 4

titled large areas of the Departments of El Quiche,
Huehuetenango, Solala, Chimaltenango, Quezaltenango, San Marcos, Alta Verapaz and Baja Verapaz. They
also migrated in large numbers into the Indian
highlands, assuming control over local municipal
governments and serving as hiring agents for the coastal
coffee plantations.
The land and labor legislation of the Guatemalan
Reform period explains the present pattern of agrarian
poverty and underdevelopment that exists in the highland region. According to the Guatemalan Agrarian
Census of 1964, nearly 88 percent of the farm units in
Guatemala-microfincas and sub-familiar farms-are
too small for subsistence and occupy only 20 percent of
the country's land area. On the other hand, a mere 2
percent of the farm units-essentially large coffee, cotton, sugar cane, and banana plantations-control nearly 60 percent of the land area.
Even more revealing is the ethnic distribution of land
ownership in Guatemala. The highland region of the
country is characterized by the classic munifundia pattern of peasant agriculture with its low productivity,
lack of access to credit, and severe soil erosion. Over 90
percent of the farm units enumerated as belonging to
Indians in 1964 were insufficient in size to support an
Indian family for a year. Moreover, within the highland
region itself, there is a clear pattern of class stratification along ethnic lines. According to the 1950 Agrarian
Census, in all nine highland Indian departments-with
the possible exception of Totonicapan-the average size
of ladino farms was significantly larger than that of
Indians.
On almost every social indicator, Guatemalan Indians
are among the poore_st population &_roups in Latin
America. Per-capita income in the Guatemalan highlands is estimated to be below $200 per year. Illiteracy
rates r.each 80 percent in the countryside. Eighty-one out
of every 1,000 babies born in Guatemala die in their first
year of life. Population in the nine highland Indian
departments has grown at an average rate of 2.5 percent
per year.
Faced with these conditions, Indians have been forced
to _supplement their meager farm incomes by seasonally
migrating as farm laborers to the large coffee, cotton,
and sugar cane plantations of the Guatemalan Pacific
coast. In the late 1960's, this seasona_l farm_labor stream
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numbered more than 600,000 people. The average daily
wage for farmworkers at this time was 80 cents and living conditions, according to an international Labor
Organization study, "were totally unacceptable with
regard to hygiene, health, education, and morality."
During the regimes of Presidents Juan Jose Arevalo
(1945 through 1950) and Jacobo Arbenz ( 1951 through
1954), the Guatemalan government attempted to alleviate some of these conditions. The revolutionary governments of Arevalo and Arbenz recognized the historic
conditions of economic exploitation and cultural discrimination faced by Indians, and they tried to redirect
government programs toward the country's massive
peasantry. The specific needs of Indians, for example,
were addressed in the Guatemalan Constitution of 1945,
the law of Forced Rentals of 1947, and the Agrarian
Reform Law (Decree Number 900) of 1952. Anthropological studies indicate that a widespread "sociological
awakening" took place in Indian communities during
the revolutionary period. For the first time, the government promoted the establishment of schools, clinics,
technical assistance programs, political parties, and
local agrarian committees in the Indian highlands.
Following the Castillo Armas takeover (a well-recognized CIA-run invasion) in 1954, the Roman Catholic
Church began to have a greater influence in Indian communities . With the support of the government and a
conservative Archbishop, foreign missionaries were
given permission to set up schools, clinics, and parishes
in Indian areas. Initially, these missionaries were "anticommunist" in their political philosophy and motivated
by a desire to wipe out the traditional religious brother-hoods or cofradias of the Indians. After the second
Vatican Council in 1962 and the Latin American
Bishops' Conference in 1968, a more socially reformist
orientation began to characterize Roman Catholic missionary work.
The Roman Catholic Church played an extremely
important role in the development of the cooperative
movement in Guatemala. Although some attempts at
cooperative formation had taken place during the
Arevalo regime, these came to a halt after the Arbenz
agarian reform law was passed in 1952. In the late 1950s
and early 1960s, however, the Church began to promote
cooperatives in rural areas. By 1967., there were 145
agricultural, consumer, and credit cooperatives actively

functioning in the country with a membership of over
27,000 people.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S.
Agency for International Development provided several
million dollars for the further development of the cooperative movement. By March 1976, there were 510 cooperatives in Guatemala, organized into eight large federations, and with a combined membership of more than
132,000 people. Fifty-seven percent of these cooperatives were located in the Indian highlands where,
according to reports written at the time, they were having a major impact on Indian political attitudes,
marketing strategies, and agricultural techniques.
In 1974, President Kjell Laugerud took the unprecedented step of providing official support for the cooperative movement. Jose Migel .Gaitan, an outspoken supporter of the cooperative movement, was named deputy
manager of BANDESA-the national agricultural credit bank-and the government promised several million
dollars for cooperative development. A number of
cooperative leaders were also invited to the presidential
palace to discuss the role of the cooperative movement
in the government's new five-year development plan.
The motives behind the government's new policy
toward the cooperatives became clear following the
tragic earthquake that shook Guatemala in February
1976. The Guatemalan earthquake, as many observers
have noted, was as much a "class phenomenon" as it
was a ''natural disaster.'' Most of the damage took
place in slum areas of Guatemala City and in the
Department of Chimaltenango, where the cooperative
movement had its greatest strength. In the aftermath of
the earthquake, the government proved entirely incapable of directing the national reconstruction effort.
Hence, cooperative members sought independent aid
from international relief agencies and began the process
of local reconstruction themselves.
Just one month after the earthquake, the government
also began military operations in the Department of El

Quiche. At the same time, a full-scale military effort
was launched along the Northern Frontier Strip, where
a number of international petroleum companies had
been given exploration permits .a nd where, for several
years, the government had promised peasant colonists
titles to land.
The scope of this militarization of Indian areas came
to world attention in May 1978 when members of a
special forces unit of the Guatemalan army killed over
100 Kekchi' Indian peasants in the town of Panzos, Alta
Verapaz. Many people hoped that the international
attention that focused on the Panzos massacre would
bring an end to government terrorism and violence. The
Panzos massacre, however, was only the beginning of a
more systematic campaign of terror against the Indian
peoples of the country.
Throughout 1978 and 1979, the military occupied several towns in El Quiche, kidnapping catechists and cooperative members under the premise that they were
assisting guerrilla forces in the area. In January 1980, a
group of Quiche peasants went to Guatemala City to
protest the military occupation of their communities.
The peasants were particularly outraged by the disappearance of seven catechists from Uspantan who the
army had kidnapped, executed, and then buried in a
common grave near Chajul. After taking their case to
the Guatemalan Congress and several radio stations, the
Indians went to the Spanish Embassy to seek the assistance of the ambassador in obtaining an investigation of
the deaths. The Guatemalan government responded to
the peasants by surrounding the embassy with police
and then burning it down. Thirty-nine people were
killed in this incident, including 30 peasants from
Quiche, seven embassy staff members and two Guatemalan politicians.
After the Spanish Embassy massacre, it became clear
that only a well-organized and clandestine movement
would be able to counter the violence of the government. In 1978, a new organization called the Committee
for Peasant Unity (CUC) was formed to defend the
rights of farmworkers in Guatemala. CUC is the first
labor organization in the history of Guatemala to link
highland Indian peasants with poor Ladino workers.
While the organization had been forced to function in
secrecy and has seen many of its leaders killed, it has the
support of thousands of seasonal and permanent farmworkers.
In February 1980, CUC called a strike of 70,000 cane
cutters and 40,000 cotton workers, forcing the government to raise the legal minimum wage of farmworkers
from $1.12 to $3.20 per day. The following September,
another CUC strike of 10,000 coffee pickers almost led
to the abandonment of the coffee harvest on fifteen
plantations in the municipality of Colomba. The coffee
strike was particularly important, because it occurred in
an economic sector that employs more workers, provides more tax revenues, and accounts for a greater proportion of export earnings than any other part of the
Guatemalan economy.
Currently, two guerrilla organizations-the Guerrilla
continued on page 7

3

Fake a D e a l - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - has bloomed in the more common climate of apathy.
Instead of reversing the arms race, the six thousand
meetings have institutionalized it.
In the course of all this talk, there have been only a
few fleeting episodes in which the superpowers came
close to even partially diverting the arms race. These
moments of opportunity were found and lost in each
side's shifting perceptions of its military and political
advantage. And each side has kept at least one eye
focused on its image as a seeker of peace, a focus that
sharpens considerably, as it is sharpening today, whenever protest erupts .
A History of Illusion
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In the service of the status quo, history is best obliterated while illusion is made resilient and recyclable. Taking advantage of this modern axiom, Vice President
Bush pointedly recalled in an April speech that just after
World War II a generous American proposal for stopping the arms race before it started was met with "a
loud 'nyet. "'
It is true that many Americans at that time were anxious to bring the atom under cooperative international
control. Even before the 1945 attack on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, some of the scientists who created the Bomb
tried to prevent the dizzying nuclear arms race they correctly predicted it would set off.
In June of that year, a group of them submitted a
memorandum known as the Franck Report to Secretary
of War Stimson, asking that the first public demonstration of an atomic explosion take place on a remote
deserted site rather than over a Japanese city. The
report also suggested that the US then renounce the use
of this weapon if other nations would do the same.
These suggestions were not given serious consideration.
After the Hiroshima and Nagasaki devastation, more
scientists, a significant percentage of the public, and
even some politicians concluded that the secret of the
atom must be shared among all the nations of the world
if disaster was to be avoided. Stimson himself, who had
supported the bombings, proposed an "atomic partnership'' with the Russians.
But other policymakers had quite different ideas.
General Leslie Groves, the military overseer of the wartime bomb project, was typical of those who pushed for
a hefty military share in the control of the atom. This
was the same crew that strongly opposed international
cooperation in nuclear development. A debate between
them and proponents of civilian and international control raged for months in Congress.
One of the lobbying methods of the Groves group was
to whip up public hysteria with scare stories about the
need to protect the "secret of the atom" from Russian
"atom spies." In reality, "technical secrets" were of
secondary importance. The basic principles of atomic
explosions were known to scientists from many countries, and American scientists testified that the Russians
would have the Bomb within a few years. (What was
kept secret was an ambitious and inevitably futile effort

directed by Groves to corner the world's supplies of
uranium and thorium.)
In 1946, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act,
making it illegal for American scientists to continue to
share nuclear information even with England or Canada
-whose scientists and engineers had made large contributions to the wartime effort that produced the Bomb,
and who, after all, were America's closest allies. The act
also gave the military much of the control over nuclear
development that it wanted.
Still, there continued to be so much high-level sentiment for international control of the atom that the US
submitted to the United Nations what now seems a drastically liberal proposal. The first version of what later
became known as the Baruch Plan declared that the
United States was willing to submit to a world authority
. for the Atomic Era.
The Soviet Union was not impressed. Some historians
attribute its wariness solely to Stalin's paranoia. The
fact is that the ''world authority'' would have been constituted through the United Nations, which at that time
was effectively controlled by the Americans. Soviet suspicions grew-with growing reason-as the plan went
through several revisions, each considerably less magnanimous than the last.
One of the early but already fatally flawed versions of
the plan was drawn up by a group of scientists, military
men and executives from corporations which had played
key roles in the Bomb's development. The major drawback of this plan was a requirement that the Soviet
Union immediately hand over control of its uranium
deposits to the "international authority." The US was
asked only to promise to share its nuclear secrets and
stop producing bombs at some unspecified future date,
whenever the international body could agree on a permanent treaty.
The plan was further butchered when President Truman chose financier Bernard Baruch to translate it into
"more workable" terms. Baruch 's yet-more-hawkish
group insisted on a provision for " swift and sure
punishment" of any nation that violated the ban on
nuclear development. This threat was clearly aimed at
the Soviets, who had already begun a frantic scramble
for a nuke of their own.
In the words of journalist I.F. Stone, by this time the
proposal ''must have seemed to Moscow the blueprint
for a world capitalist super-state in which the US would
retain its atomic monopoly behind the facade of an
international organization under US control." Dean
Acheson, then undersecretary of state and one of the
authors of the plan, admitted years later that the Baruch
revisions ''meant certain defeat of the treaty by Soviet
veto.''
The Soviet counter-proposal, offered by its UN delegate, Andrei Gromyko, called for the destruction of all
nuclear weapons in existence and the cessation of their
production. The American response came four days
before the formal rejection. On July 1, 1946, the US set
off its first postwar test explosion over Bikini Atoll.
Alva Myrdal, a Swedish diplomat who spent twelve

years as an arms controller and then wrote a book called

The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and
Russia Run the Arms Race, writes of this period, "The
pattern ... had been set: both sides would present proposals for disarmament agreements, of often wholesale
dimensions, but would be careful to see to it that those
would contain conditions which the opposite side could
not accept."
The A-Bomb's Big Brother
The next serious sidling up to arms control came in
1955, after the arms race had gained considerable
momentum. The Soviets had exploded their first atomic
bomb in 1949. The US detonated the first hydrogen
bomb, massively larger than the fission type, in 1952;
the USSR matched this feat a year later.
Arms negotiations had been stuck for years on the
issue of inspection of military sites: the US accused the
Soviets of wanting disarmament without inspection,
while the Soviets felt that US proposals called for
inspection without disarmament.
Then, on May 10, in the middle of arms control talks
being held in London, the Soviet Union suddenly announced it would agree to the West's plan for international inspection of nuclear sites and to its figures for
ceilings on conventional armies. These proposed limits
on armed forces were attractive to the Soviets because
of their fear that West Germany, which had joined
NATO on May 5, was about to rebuild a large army.
The Soviets virtually plagiarized their new position from

British and French proposals, which in turn closely
reflected the American negotiating position.
European diplomats were jubilant at the breakthrough. "It's almost too good to be true," the French
delegate enthused. The American and British delegates
both issued statements confirming that the Soviet proposals were in large measure the same as theirs.
In Washington, however, the response was strangely
restrained. Perhaps because its arms control offers had
not been meant to be taken seriously, the US made a
startling turnaround of its own. President Eisenhower
began making speeches questioning the wisdom of letting Soviets inspect US military sites. After a recess, the
US delegate returned to the London negotiations to announce the withdrawal of every previous American proposal-including the ones that were so close to what the
Soviets now said they'd go along with.
The Soviets had agreed to every substantial American
condition, and the response from the US was that it
hadn't really meant it that way. It was this "no," not a
"nyet," which scuttled the closest approach to a real
arms control agreement ever.
Shortly afterward, a new factor entered the arms control equation. Popular protest against nuclear weapons,
which had been extremely muted during the decade following the war, made an appearance.
Fear of Fallout
The catalyzing event for the protest was a 1954 American nuclear test on the Bikini Atoll. Fallout from the
multimegaton explosion, blown by the wind in an unanticipated direction, rained onto hundreds of Marshall
Islanders and a Japanese fishing boat called the Lucky
Dragon. The Marshallese were quickly moved to
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another island by the US Navy, but many fell ill. (They
and their children continue to feel the effects of their
exposure to this day.) All the Japanese fishermen got
radiation sickness, and one died of it six months later.
The fate of the Lucky Dragon touched off an investigation of the health effects of radioactive fallout. Many
prominent scientists, including Albert Einstein and
Linus Pauling, supported the disturbing findings, which
launched nearly a decade of protest against atmospheric
testing.
Unfortunately, the danger from the use of nuclear
bombs on real targets was either too little understood or
too overwhelming to be targeted by the antitesting campaign. It was the cancer predictions and the strontium-90 in the baby's milk that evoked a frenzy of fear
and widespread dissent.
The peace movement picked up the ball and ran. It
looked like a winning strategy: concentrate on the fallout, downplay the possibility of nuclear holocaust, and
ignore the politics of the arms race.
By the late fifties, a campaign to push for a comprehensive test ban treaty was well under way. It won the
backing of significant majorities in the United States,
Western and Eastern Europe, Japan, and many other
countries. In Britain, ban-the-bomb sentiment grew into
a movement, with sit-ins, rallies, and huge demonstrations like the Aldermaston Easter March in 1960.
A group of "nonaligned" countries, responding to
anti-Bomb sentiment in their own backyards, worked
out a detailed plan for a comprehensive test ban treaty.
Most nonnuclear countries declared themselves willing
to sign a multilateral ban, despite the fact that it would
hamper their efforts to develop nuclear weapons and
would thereby institutionalize the superpowers'
monopoly.
The protests and negotiations lasted for several years.
These were years during which the arms race passed several important mileposts of escalation, with unfortunately little reaction from the testing-preoccupied protest movement. The superpowers first stopped the
atmospheric tests, then, led by the Soviets, started them
again. The Soviets launched the Sputnik and shot down
an American U-2 plane secretly spying over its territory;
Eisenhower warned of the military-industrial complex;
Kennedy invented a fictional "missile gap" and faced
down Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis.
The Arms Race Goes Underground

Finally, in 1963, the Soviets again backed down on a
long-held negotiating position. This time they gave up
their insistence that an agreement cover all kinds of testing. Abandoning the ongoing multilateral efforts to
achieve a comprehensive test ban, the US and the USSR
began bilateral talks · in Moscow. Within weeks, they
had concocted a partial test ban treaty.
The partial ban merely moved the tests underground.
It was by no means a barrier to further nuclear development on either side: the US was already setting off more
test explosions underground or underwater than in the
atmosphere.
6

Not only did the partial treaty fail to contain the arms
race, it wound up clearing the way for its escalation.
Despite the fact that Khrushchev had given in to Kennedy's terms, right-wing politicians in the US accused
the president of being soft on the Commies . The support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was finally won by the
administration's argument that forcing the tests underground, where they are more difficult and expensive,
would hamper the Soviet nuclear advance far more than
the American one. But the real selling point for the
hawks was Kennedy's pledge of lots of new, more
sophisticated weapons.
As limited as the treaty was, and as sweetened with
promises of arms escalation, it met with resistance in the
Senate. George McGovern finally exclaimed in exasperation that ''the Administration has been called upon to
give so many assurances of our continued nuclear efforts . . . that a casual observer might assume that we are
approving this treaty so that we can accelerate the arms
race and beef up the war-making facilities of our
country!"
To most people, this judgment was not so clear at the
time. Alva Myrdal, who had been instrumental in the
multilateral push for a comprehensive ban, remembers,
"I only gradually experienced this fateful turn of events
as a rude awakening . So hopeful were we that we
euphorically hailed this agreement as of utmost importance. We took it for granted, as we were told, that it
was the first step towards the discontinuance of all testing of nuclear weapons." Later, Myrdal wrote that the
partial ban "can hardly be considered among disarmament measures," though "it should be given some credit as a public health measure.''
The partial test ban was greeted by the peace movement as its greatest victory. The campaign that had fed
on the fear of fallout swallowed the treaty hook, line,
and sinker. Then, unprepared to deal with any but the
narrowest of nuclear concerns, it practically vanished.
In the following years , underground testing proved
adequate for the development of all kinds of new weapons. The most destabilizing of these were MIRVs, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, which
allow a single missile to deliver numerous nuclear warheads to different targets. Because the number of warheads per missile can no longer be easily verified and because their precision makes possible a first strike against
the other side's strategic missiles, MIRVs helped make
arms control more unlikely than ever.
"Why SALT Spells Fraud"

Starting in 1967 and through the seventies, arms control centered on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
(SALT). Two superpower agreements, together known
as SALT I, were reached in 1972: one limiting the
deployment of antiballistic missiles and another limiting
the increase in strategic arms (nuclear-tipped missiles
with intercontinental range). SALT II, signed in 1974
but never ratified by the US Senate, established a ceiling
on the number of MIRVs each side was allowed.
None of the SALT agreements meant elimination or

even reductions of weapons. On the contrary, in the
words of Myrdal, "there is only a haggling over marginal differences in their continued increase." In fact, the
ceilings to which the superpowers agreed were amazingly close to the numbers they had planned to deploy anyway. No limitations at all were placed on tactical (shortrange) or conventional weapons or on qualitative
improvements of strategic missiles or warheads. Work
on the cruise missile, one of the most destabilizing new
weapons of the last decade , was begun after the SALT I
agreement was signed. According to Fred Kaplan (Boston Globe, July 19, 1982), the cruise program was funded by the Nixon administration "as a bargaining chip to
strengthen the US hand in SALT II negotiations ." (The
cruise is a small, jet-powered missile that is supposed to
be able to evade radar detection by flying close to the
ground with the aid of a terrain-following computer
guidance system.)
One difference between SALT and earlier arms control agreements is the extent to which commentators
immediately saw it as a charade. In 1969, three years
before the first treaty was signed, I.F. Stone wrote an
article called "Why SALT Spells Fraud."
Myrdal commented, "By no stretch of the imagination can SALT II be called arms limitation. Instead it is
a mutually agreed continuation of the arms race , regulated and institutionalized."
Keep On Talking

Although arms control is little more than what Stone
calls a "theater of delusion," we can expect endless curtain calls. Talk about arms control will keep pace with
new rounds in the arms race.
The arm s control ritual allows each superpower to
hail its valiant efforts for peace, efforts (each one
laments) that have been tragically foiled by the other
side. The basic decency of each government is affirmed
and support for its ever-escalating arms buildup-and
its other policies-is assured.
Thus legitimized, the superpowers are free to continue usi ng the permanent nuclear showdown as they
always have. Like the Cold War it complements, "arms
control" is a device by which the superpowers control
the governments of other countries, their allies, and
their own populations.
Marcy Darnovsky is a member of the Abalone Alliance, a
California-based anti-nuclear gro up organizing against both
weapons and nuclear power. The original version of this article
appeared in their newsletter, It's A bout Times. This version is
reprinted from Radical America, Vol. 6, No . 4-5.

Guatemala
Army of the Poor (EGP) and Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA)-are also active in
Indian areas of Guatemala. The EGP, which was organized in 1975, has been particularly active in the departments of Huehuetenango, El Quiche, and Alta Verapaz,
as well as along the south coast around Escuintla. In the
northern highlands, the EGP has ambushed a number
of army patrols, and perfected a tactic of "armed propaganda." Guerrilla units will launch lightning raids of
towns and plantations, and then hold propaganda meetings in the native languages. Over the past two years, the
EGP is reported to have established a firm base among
the local indigenous population . The EGP Ernesto Guevara guerrilla front, which was established in Huehuetenango in 1979, is said to be made up almost entirely of
Indians.
ORPA has had similar successes among Indian peoples in the center and western parts of the country. In
September 1980, ORPA occupied several Indian towns
around Lake Atitlan in the Department of Solola, conducting propaganda meetings among local residents,
and forcing many tourists to leave the area. In response,
the Guatemalan government set up an army base in Santiago Atitlan and then began to terrorize the local Indian population . Gaspar Culan-the director of the Indian language radio station, La Vaz de Atitlan-and
several other Indians were murdered by the army in one
of its anti-guerrilla
raids. When the people
protested
about this incident and other acts of repression by the
army to the mayor of Solola, they were told that they
could expect no help from the government as long as
ORPA continues to function in the area.
During 1981, the civil war in Guatemala became so intense that the government began to kidnap and murder
anyone who was involved in rural development work. In
February 1981, the army entered the village of Las
Lomas in San Martin Jilotepeque in Chimaltenango,
burned all of the houses to the ground, and killed more
than 85 Indian men, women and children. Death lists in
Chimaltenango, at this time, included members of the
National Reconstruction Committee, leaders of community unions, and artists' groups, Christian Democratic mayors, school teachers and lawyers, and even
members of the local Alcoholics Anonymous.
There is a common saying in Guatemala that when
the Indians begin to rise up, the volcanos that dot the
mountain landscape will begin to erupt. Today, the Indians of Guatemala are only beginning to flex their
muscles. Someday soon, however, the full force of the
volcano will erupt. When that happens, a new Guatemala will be born .
D
Shelton H. Davis, an anthropologist and member of the
Guatemala Scholar's Network , is the founder of the Anthropology Resource Center (ARC), a past recipient of Resist
funds. This article originally appeared in Akwesasne Notes in
the summer of 1981, before the Rios Monte government took
over in Guatemala . The article is reprinted here from Native
Peoples in Struggle, a new book co-published by ARC and the
Emergency Response International Network. The book is
available from the latter for $12.99. Wtite E.R.I.N. Publications, PO Box 41, Bombay, NY 12914.
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Animal Rights. Resist's grant will help suport two European peace activists who are interning at SPC this year.

DRAFT INFORMATION ALLIANCE (539 8th Ave.,
Menlo Park, CA 94025).
The Draft Information Alliance (DIA) is a network of
"Third World" draft counselors and minority-based
draft counseling and education projects throughout
California. Their goal is to provide training, education,
resource-sharing and networking services in order to
strengthen existing draft and counter-recruitment programs in Chicano, Indian, Black and Asian communities. The services that DIA provides are of crucial
importance for several reasons. First, minority communities have always been disproportionately affected by
the US military. 26% of the casualties of the Vietnam
war were Blacks and 16-20% were Latinos. The general
population consisted of only 12% Blacks and 5%
Latinos at the time. Second, the "poverty draft," which
forces minority and other low income youth to enlist in
the military as their options for employment, job training and education disappear, has resulted in over 50%
minority representation in the "volunteer" army. Finally, issues relating to the draft and military service touch
upon cultural values and family relationships as well as
social and economic conditions. For all these reasons
there is a critical need to train minority draft counselors
who can provide the culturally sensitive draft and counter-recruitment counseling that has been lacking in most
draft counseling projects. DIA is made up entirely of
Chicano, Black and Indian draft counselors with a high
degree of participation by Chicano and Black Vietnam
Vets. Resist's grant will be used for general support.

EL CENTRO CAMPESINO FARMWORKER CENTER (Bos 3021, Winter Haven, .FL).
El Centro is an organization of Mexican, Haitian, Salvadoran, and American farmworkers. It is based in
Polk County, the heart of Florida's citrus industry,
where 25,000 orange pickers live and work. In Polk
County there are twice as many workers as there are
jobs, and there is no central place for workers to go to
find out what work is available. Many of the crew leaders for the migrant industry are unscrupulous: they
often cheat, beat and intimidate the workers. Housing
that landlords will rent to farmworkers (non-white) with
children is in very short supply and bad condition. Doctors and hospitals turn sick people away and the social
welface agencies provide more jobs to middle class
whites than services to farmworkers. The prejudice of
native rural whites is aggravated by language barriers
for both Hispanics and Haitians, most of whom speak
°little English. About three-fourths of all the Hispanic
farmworkers in the county are un-documented (8,000).
They are subject to unjust treatment, by both police and
migrant officers, in direct violation of immigration laws
and regulations. With education, workers are able to
counter such violations and avoid deportation . El Centro has recently established a Rights Committee which is
comprised of 12 organizers who work on civil rights
issues including: immigration, police abuse, crew leader
abuse and support of union organizing. Resist's grant
will support this project.
ADDITIONAL GRANTS

SYRACUSE PEACE COUNCIL (124 Burnet, Syracuse, NY 13203).
The Syracuse Peace Council has been an active group in
upstate New York since 1936. Syracuse is only 50 miles
from the Seneca Army Depot, one of two storage sites
in the US for nuclear weapons being shipped to Europe,
most notably the neutron bomb and the Pershing II.
Additionally, upstate NY is the site of many military
bases, nuclear waste storage sites and toxic chemical
dumps. SPC works hard to include a philosophy of nonviolence, feminism and anti-militarism in their work.
Their vision of the world is a place "where war, violence
and exploitation of all kinds (economic, racial, sexual,
age, etc.) do not exist.'' An important part of their work
is monthly publication of the Peace Newsletter. They
use the publication as a forum for both local and national issues such as: the massacre in Lebanon, local
draft resistance updates, civilian based defense, the
Freeze, local congressional candidates and Arab-Black
community relations in Syracuse. Some task forces and
projects of SPC include Upstate Feminist Peace
Alliance, Citizens United Against Police Brutality,
Cruise Missile Project and Seneca Army Depot, Nuclear
Weapons Freeze Campaign, Upstate Resistance, East
Timar Human Rights Committee, Friends of Central
America United in Support, Anarchist Study Group and
8

MUJERES LATINAS (500 Talbot Ave., Dorchester,
MA 02124)
COMMUNITY WORKS (c/ o The Paulist Center, 5
Park St., Boston, MA 02111)
SUBSTITUTES UNITED FOR BETTER SCHOOLS
(SUBS, 50 E. Van Buren , Rm 810, Chicago, IL
60605)
CLERGY AND LAITY CONCERNED (PO Box
90557, Nashville TN 37209)
8TH INTERNATIONAL INDIAN TREATY COUNCIL CONFERENCE (1145 E. 6th St., Tucson, AZ
85719)
COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH PRISON SLAVERY
(PO Box 3207, Washington, DC 20010)
COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE MEXICANO
POLITICAL PRISONERS (PO Box 1073, Alamosa,
co 81101)

